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Abstract 
 
The United States, like the larger international community, likely will tend toward 
greater abolition of the death penalty during the first half of the twenty-first century. A handful 
of individual states—states that have historically carried out few or no executions—probably will 
abolish capital punishment over the next twenty years, which will create political momentum and 
ultimately a federal constitutional ban on capital punishment in the United States. It is entirely 
reasonable to expect that, by the mid-twenty-first century, capital punishment will have the same 
status internationally as torture: an outlier practice, prohibited by international agreements and 
customary international law, practiced illicitly by rogue nations, and defended only by a handful 
of conservative academics seeking attention. 
Within retentionist states, the transition to abolition will most likely occur as a result of 
elite political leadership and ordinary acts of resistance. Experience suggests that abolition of 
the death penalty is rarely the result of loud and explicit democratic politics, but is instead more 
often the product of counter-majoritarian, at times elite-driven judicial or political maneuvers. 
Abolition is rarely an issue that builds political capital for emerging leaders, but instead one that 
requires using existing political capital. Another important but rarely discussed factor that 
promotes abolitionist reforms are ordinary acts of resistance by those who are either knowingly 
or unconsciously uncomfortable with capital punishment or truly opposed to the death penalty. 
These men and women—a clerk at the county courthouse, an employee at the local police 
department, a secretary in the prosecutor’s office, sometimes even a judge or law clerk—slow 
death penalty cases down and effectively undermine the machinery of death.  
Neither of these two factors are especially good topics for elaboration since both take 
place below visibility. Yet they both play important roles and will likely push retentionist states 
at the cusp into the abolitionist camp, continuing the national and global trend toward greater 
abolition of the death penalty. 
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 Is the United States on the road to abolition and, if so, by when will it have abolished the 
death penalty? The federal structure of the United States complicates the answer to these 
questions; nevertheless, recent trends in the United States and within the larger international 
community suggest that the country is headed toward abolition of capital punishment. In all 
likelihood, a number of retentionist states will converge toward abolition over the course of the 
next twenty years. The combination of this domestic shift and the legal and political pressure of 
the international community will likely result in the United States Supreme Court imposing a 
federal constitutional ban on capital punishment, at the latest, by the mid-twenty-first century. It 
is entirely reasonable to believe that even before then—by 2035 or 2040—there will be no or 
very few executions in the United States.    
Recent statistics are extremely revealing. The United States witnessed significantly 
decreasing numbers of executions and capital sentences during the first decade of the twenty-first 
century—despite a continuing political shift toward crime-control policies, as evidenced by the 
steadily increasing rate of incarceration throughout the country.1 The historical trends are 
reflected in the following graphs. The first reflects a steep decline in the number of executions in 
the first decade of the twenty-first century2:  
                                                            
1 Federal and state prison populations increased dramatically from under 200,000 persons in 1970 to more than 
1.3 million in 2002. That year, our imprisonment rate rose above 600 inmates per 100,000 adults. With the inclusion 
of an additional 700,000 inmates in jail, the United States incarcerates more than two million people—resulting in 
the highest incarceration number and rate in the world, five times that of Britain and 12 times that of Japan. The 
numbers and rates have continued to increase during the first decade of the twenty-first century.  See Harcourt 2007. 
2 DPIC 2008 
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It is important to note that, of the 42 executions that were carried out in 2007, the state of 
Texas accounted for 26 (or 62%) of the total, and only nine other states participated in the 
statistic (Alabama and Oklahoma executing three inmates each, Indiana, Ohio and Tennessee 
two inmates respectively, and Arizona, Georgia, South Carolina, and South Dakota one inmate 
each).3 This reflects the fact that the death penalty in the United States has become 
predominantly a Texas phenomenon and that, putting aside Texas (and occasionally a few other 
outlier states like Alabama or Georgia or Virginia), very few executions are being carried out in 
the rest of the country.  
The decrease in the annual number of executions has gone hand-in-hand with a similar 
decrease over the period in the number of persons sentenced to death in the United States, as 
reflected in this second graph:4 
 
                                                            
3 DPIC; NAACP LDF Death Row USA 
4  DPIC 2008 
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The declining trend in the imposition of capital sentences is not only true at the national, 
aggregated level, but also at the individual state level. Even in a state like Texas, prosecutors and 
politicians have tempered their enthusiasm for death sentences.5  
In addition, the number of abolitionist states has increased since the United States 
Supreme Court approved post-Furman capital statutes. Since then, Massachusetts, North Dakota, 
Rhode Island, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont joined the ranks of eight other abolitionist 
states (Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin) that 
had never legalized capital punishment.6 This trend is reflected in the following graph:   
 
                                                            
5  Steiker and Steiker 2008: ____.   
6  Jacobs and Carmichael 2002: 115. 
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 These graphs and the underlying data are merely the objective reflection of a series of 
unexpected developments at the individual state level, many of which are recounted in greater 
detail in the chapters of this book. New York state reinstated and flirted with the death penalty in 
the early 1990s, but after several years, ultimately rejected capital punishment. A Republican 
governor in Illinois, George Ryan, imposed a moratorium on the death penalty because of the 
mounting number of wrongful convictions and then commuted the death sentences of all inmates 
on Illinois’ death row.7 The Supreme Court overturned its prior decisions and restricted the 
substantive scope of the death penalty, prohibiting its use in the case of juveniles and persons 
with mental retardation.8 In over 125 cases, persons accused of capital crimes and sentenced to 
death were exonerated after an average of almost 10 years on death row.9 In December 2007, 
Governor Jon Corzine of New Jersey signed a bill abolishing the state’s death penalty. At about 
the same time, the Supreme Court effectively imposed a temporary moratorium on the death 
                                                            
7  See Radelet 2008: ___. 
8  See Steiker and Steiker 2008: ____. 
9  DPIC 2008 (available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=6&did=110); of those, only 16 of 
the exonerations are based on DNA evidence. Id. See generally,  Cole & Aronson 2008: ___ for a nuanced 
assessment of political influence of the DNA exonerations. 
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penalty while the justices considered the legality of lethal injection.10 And, according to reliable 
reports, “In states like Maryland, New Mexico and South Dakota, legislative efforts to repeal the 
death penalty—once considered hopeless—now appear to be within a few votes of success. 
Blue-ribbon committees similar to the one in New Jersey have been appointed in places like 
Illinois, Tennessee, Maryland and Florida.”11 
 These domestic shifts mirror the larger international trend toward abolition of the death 
penalty. As Roger Hood, William Schabas, and others have shown, there has been a global 
tendency toward abolition over the course of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries—a trend 
which grew in increasing proportion in the last decades of the twentieth.12 Whether one considers 
countries that have abolished capital punishment for ordinary crimes only or for all crimes, the 
proportion of abolitionist countries has increased significantly. As Roger Hood notes, “the 
annual average rate at which countries have abolished the death penalty trebled: from roughly 
one a year in the period 1965-88, to three a year over the years 1989-2000.”13 This is 
demonstrated in the following graph:14  
 
                                                            
10  See Denno 2008: ___; Kaufman-Osborn 2008: ___;  Martschukat 2008: ___. Deborah Denno, Timothy 
Kaufman-Osborn and Jurgen Martschukat disagree as to the likely impact of the lethal injection challenges, with 
Kaufman-Osborn expressing the most cautionary view. What is not contested, though, is that the temporary 
moratorium created by the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari on the lethal injection issue significantly reduced the 
number of persons executed in 2007 and 2008, and that the temporary moratorium contributed to the downward 
trend in the number of executions. Incidentally, the temporary moratorium also created a natural experiment that 
will afford social scientists an opportunity to test, once again, the deterrent effect of the death penalty—which will 
likely provide further fodder for both sides of the death penalty debates. 
11 Drehle 2007.  
12 Hood 2001; William A. Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law. Third Edition. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002; Neumayer 2006. 
13 Hood 2001:333. 
14 Relying on data from Neumayer 2006 (Tables 1 and 2). 
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It is worth noting here that the graph does not even include, in the category of abolitionist 
states, countries that have not executed anyone in the past ten years—what are referred to as de 
facto abolitionist states. These numbered eighteen as of 2004.15  
As a result of this global trend, Amnesty International reports that, at year end 2005, 86 
countries had abolished the death penalty for all crimes and another 36 countries were 
abolitionist in practice (either because they had abolished capital punishment for ordinary 
crimes, retaining it only for military or other exceptional circumstances, or because they had not 
executed anyone in the past 10 years). In other words, 122 countries were effectively 
abolitionist.16 This represents a significant majority of the countries in the world, over 60 
                                                            
15 Neumayer 2006, table 3. 
16 Amnesty 2006: 17. 
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percent. Only 71 countries retained the death penalty for ordinary crimes at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century.17   
Part of this trend is certainly attributable to Europe’s militant opposition to capital 
punishment and the requirement that states abolish the death penalty in order to gain European 
Union membership. This influence can be expected to continue for the next several decades. But 
the European Union does not explain the depth of the global trend. Some of the countries that 
have abolished the death penalty for all crimes since 2000 include, for instance, the Philippines, 
Samoa, Mexico, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, and Bhutan. The depth of the international sentiment is 
widely spread and reflected well in the vote of the United Nations General Assembly in 
December 2007 calling for a worldwide moratorium on executions. As Michael Radelet suggests 
in his contribution, “The vote was overwhelming: 104 of the U.N.’s member states supported the 
resolution, while only 54 opposed it and 29 abstained.”18 
The most rigorous, quantitative, cross-national analyses of the global trend toward 
abolition have identified a number of leading predictors, including for instance regional peer 
pressure and the level of democratization of a country. Along practically all of these predictor 
dimensions, the United States as a whole should already be in the abolitionist camp—not just 
fourteen of the fifty states plus the District of Columbia, but the whole country. To be sure, the 
fact that the United States as a whole does not now rank among abolitionist states may simply be 
the fortuitous and contingent result of the Supreme Court’s near miss decision in Furman v. 
Georgia in 1972.19 It is also difficult to speak of the United States “as a whole”—putting aside 
the federal death penalty—given the unique federalist structure of the country in the area of 
                                                            
17  Hood, Capital Punishment at 350 (Table 1) (71 countries retained death penalty for ordinary crimes in 
December 2000). 
18  Radelet 2008: ___. 
19  Carol S. Steiker, “Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism,” Oregon Law Review 81 (2002):97-
130. 
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penal administration. Regardless, it is likely that the political forces that have shaped these trends 
toward abolition at the international level will continue to exercise pressure on the United States 
and individual retentionist states in this country. Peer and regional international political 
pressure—combined with the overall decline in violent crime,20 a more moderated public opinion 
when presented with the sentencing option of life imprisonment without parole,21 and increased 
awareness of cases of innocence and wrongful convictions22—will likely push several other 
states from de facto abolitionist and retentionist ranks to the abolitionist camp over the course of 
the next two decades—barring, naturally, unforeseen global shifts or catastrophes. This is most 
likely to occur first in states such as Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Kansas, New Hampshire, 
New Mexico, South Dakota or Wyoming, which have executed only one or no inmates since 
resumption of the death penalty in 1976, or in states such as Maryland, Illinois, or Tennessee, 
which are currently reviewing their capital punishment practices; but the political momentum 
created by these states likely will extend to other retentionist states.  
The gradual convergence of a number of retentionist states toward abolition of the death 
penalty, in combination with the increased role of international legal and political opposition to 
capital punishment, in all probability will lead the United States Supreme Court to ban capital 
punishment as a federal constitutional matter. The numerical trend and political momentum 
                                                            
20  Some commentators suggest that the war on terrorism—which has displaced the war on crime—will have the 
effect of reinvigorating the death penalty. I am skeptical of this argument and tend to believe that the terrorist acts of 
September 11, 2001, have in fact reduced the national appetite for capital punishment in the context of ordinary 
crime. The contrast between terrorist acts and typical capital murders, from my observations, has undermined the 
strength of the death penalty appeal in cases of ordinary crime. 
21  Radelet 2008: ___. Naturally, there is significant debate in the United States whether life imprisonment 
without parole is more cruel a punishment than death. I will not address this normative question. As a factual matter, 
support for the death penalty decreases when respondents are presented with the alternative of life imprisonment 
without parole and this sentencing option has been increasingly used in the United State over the past twenty years.  
22  Simon Cole and Jay Aronson express reservation about the political influence of the DNA and other 
scientific exonerations in their contribution to this book. While I agree that the argument from science does not 
normatively resolve the death penalty debate, see Cole & Aronson 2008: ___, I do believe that the fact of so many 
innocent persons having been sentenced to death has exerted a dampening effect on the national enthusiasm for the 
death penalty, and will continue to do so. 
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toward abolition likely will play an important role in the decision; but so will the greater role of 
international law in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s “evolving 
standard of moral decency,” as discussed by Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker in their 
contribution to this book.23  
Though it is difficult to chart the likely path of abolition, it is most probably that, within 
retentionist states, the transition to abolition will occur as a result of elite political leadership and 
ordinary acts of resistance. Experience has shown that abolition of the death penalty is rarely the 
result of loud and explicit democratic politics, but is instead more often the product of slightly 
counter-majoritarian, at times elite-driven judicial or political maneuvers. Abolition most often 
occurs against the backdrop of mild popular support for the death penalty. As such, it often 
entails an expenditure of political capital: it is not an issue that builds political capital for 
emerging leaders, but instead one that requires using existing political capital. Another important 
but rarely discussed factor that promotes abolitionist reform are ordinary acts of resistance by 
those who are either knowingly or unconsciously uncomfortable with capital punishment or truly 
opposed to the ultimate punishment. These men and women—a clerk at the county courthouse, 
an employee at the local police department, a secretary in the prosecutor’s office, sometimes 
even a judge or law clerk—gummy up the system and slow death penalty cases down, sometimes 
to a snail’s pace. Texas is, again, the outlier here, but it is revealing precisely for that fact: the 
reason that many other states are far less efficient than Texas at executing death row inmates is 
the product of ordinary, minor acts of resistance, sometimes conscious but often unconscious.  
Neither of these two factors are especially good topics for elaboration since both take 
place below visibility. Yet they both will likely play important roles and will push states at the 
cusp into the abolitionist camp, continuing the national and global trend toward greater abolition 
                                                            
23  Steiker & Steiker 2008: ___. 
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of the death penalty. This chapter explores these less visible dimensions of abolitionist reform, 
after first analyzing the leading indicators of abolition at the cross-national level.  
 
I. 
 The cross-national models confirm what the recent trends show: in all likelihood, the 
United States will tend toward greater abolition. There are fewer such studies than one might 
expect, but there exist two recent quantitative studies that attempt to systematically assess the 
determinants of death penalty abolition using cross national models.24 
 Eric Neumayer, a professor at the London School of Economics, has an excellent cross-
national quantitative study of global abolition and finds that the foremost determinants of 
abolition are political factors, namely democratization and regional peer pressure. In his study, 
Death Penalty: The political foundations of the global trend toward abolition, Neumayer tests a 
number of political, cultural, social and economic explanations for the significant shift, over the 
past 50 years, toward abolition. His data, for the most part, span fifty years, from 1950 to 2002.  
 Neumayer tests six political factors, including (1) a measure of the democratic nature of 
the state; (2) an indicator of regime transition to democracy (or what Neumayer calls 
“democratization”) ; (3) whether the country has a left-wing political orientation, measured by 
the World Bank’s assessment of whether the chief executive’s party is considered left-wing; (4) 
the historical experience with armed political conflict or the country’s history of warfare, which 
is expected to correlate positively with retention of capital punishment at least for treason; (5) 
                                                            
24  There are a number of other comparative studies by criminologists and sociologists that do not use 
quantitative methods that may also be insightful, but I will focus here exclusively on those that use multiple 
regression analysis. Those other studies include Martin Killias, “Power Concentration, Legitimation Crisis and Penal 
Severity: A Comparative Perspective,” Annales Internationales de Criminologie 24 (1986): 181-211; Dannies 
Wiechman, Jerry Kendall, and Ronald Bae, “International Use of the Death Penalty,” International Journal of 
Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 14 (2) (1990): 239-260; Jerome Neapolitan, “An Examination of Cross-
National Variation in Punitiveness,” International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 45 
(6) (2001): 691-710.  
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Western European pressure on Eastern European countries; and (6) international pressure from 
regional peers and neighbor countries. Neumayer also includes in his models another five 
cultural, religious, economic and social factors, including (1) whether the country’s legal system 
is based on English common law, which is believed to have a retentionist influence, (2) whether 
the society is strongly Islamic, as measured by the fraction of the Muslim population, (3) 
economic inequality, (4) ethnic and racial fractionalization, and (5) lagged rates of violent crime 
and homicide.   
Using a proportional hazards model, Neumayer finds that, with regard to abolition for all 
crimes, three political factors seem to be strongly related to abolition: the democratic nature of 
the state, transitions to democracy, and regional pressure. A fourth, participation in the Council 
of Europe, is also important, but obviously less generalizable. Having a left-wing chief executive 
is also important, but the data for the model that includes this variable is limited and covers only 
1975 to 2000 (n of 768 instead of n of 5,458 in the first model). The historical experience with 
armed political conflict is not significant. In contrast, three cultural, economic, and social factors 
seem to be associated with retention, and these are the greater degree of ethnic fractionalization, 
higher income inequality, and legal systems that are based on English common law. High 
homicide rates are also associated with retention, but here again the data are few and cover only 
the period 1975 to 2000.25  
Neumayer’s findings are mostly similar with regard to abolition for ordinary crimes, 
except that ethnic fractionalization, homicide rates, and economic inequality are no longer 
statistically significant. As a result, the key factors are predominantly political: “democracy, a 
                                                            
25  This also seems unreliable because, as Neumayer observes, “a higher lagged homicide rate lowers the 
likelihood of abolition for all crimes, but not for ordinary crimes,” (Neumayer 2006:29); yet one would think that 
the higher homicide rates should be more influential on abolition for ordinary crimes since homicide and violent 
crimes are ordinary crimes.   
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regime transition toward democracy, membership in the Council of Europe, a higher share of 
abolitionist countries within the region as well as the left-wing orientation of the chief 
executive’s party all raise the likelihood of abolition. A legal system built on English common 
law and a predominantly Muslim population have the opposite effect in some regressions with 
relatively large sample sizes.”26  
Neumayer concludes that “the continuation of the abolitionist trend is contingent on a 
further spread of democracy around the world, on political pressure imposed on retentionist 
countries, on regional peer group effects and on the political balance between conservative and 
left-wing parties within countries.”27  
 With regards specifically to the United States, Neumayer decided to code the country as 
retentionist, but also ran the analyses dropping the US from the dataset and found that this 
“hardly affects the results.”28 Neumayer writes: 
Many talk about American exceptionalism since with Japan it is the only 
democratic and developed country still holding on to the death penalty. Discussing 
possible reasons for this exceptionalism is beyond the scope of this paper. Unfortunately, 
for statistical reasons it is not possible to include a dummy variable for the US into the 
estimations to see whether the retentionist status of the US can be explained sufficiently 
by the explanatory variables, in which case the dummy variable would be insignificant, 
or whether there is something truly exceptional about the US, in which case the dummy 
variable would be statistically significant. Loosely speaking this is because with the US 
being retentionist over the entire period, such a dummy variable would predict failure to 
abolish perfectly and therefore be dropped from the model. If we exclude the US, or the 
US and Japan together, from the estimations, then results are not much affected. This is 
not very surprising given that these represent just two out of a great many countries. If we 
include dummy variables for the regions of Western Europe as well as South America to 
account for the fact that countries from these regions were often frontrunners of abolition, 
then again our results are hardly affected. It is not simple regionalism that drives 
abolition.29 
 
                                                            
26 Neumayer 2006:26. 
27 Neumayer 2006:2. 
28 Neumayer 2006:18. 
29 Neumayer 2006:26-27. 
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 On the political factors, the United States should tend toward abolition: a strong 
democracy surrounded by two abolitionist countries, Canada and Mexico, with, at least 
occasionally, a center-left chief executive at the federal and state levels. The factors that would 
tend toward retention—setting aside the peculiarities of our federal system—would include the 
English common law tradition and the high incidence of violent crime and homicide. But the 
latter should be diminishing as a contributing factor, at least since the early 1990s. To be sure, as 
Neumayer notes, “The unique character of state-determined criminal law and substantial laymen 
participation and influence on the extent of punitiveness of the criminal sanction system might 
provide hints why many states in the US maintain the death penalty and execute a great number 
of people.”30 But the political forces should still be at play and will likely influence the further 
trend toward abolition in the USA.  
 Terance Miethe, Hong Lu and Gini Deibert, in their 2005 study on Cross-National 
Variability in Capital Punishment, explore the comparative sociopolitical conditions of 185 
countries in order to determine the correlates for the legal retention or abolition of capital 
punishment. Their principal predictors include measures of economic development, political 
conditions, primary religion, location in world region, and the extent of extrajudicial executions. 
To be more specific, the measures of economic development are based on each nation’s per 
capita GDP in 2000 (the authors reach similar results using per capita income, and, due to 
missing observations for infant mortality and literacy, were unable to use a human development 
index). The political condition variables measured two separate dimensions, first, an index 
measuring how much citizens are able to participate in the selection of governments (“voice and 
accountability”) and, second, measures of the perception of political stability and presence of 
political violence. Primary religion and world region are self-explanatory. The extent of 
                                                            
30 Neumayer 2006:10. 
 
15  Harcourt:  Abolition by 2050 
extrajudicial executions were derived from a 1996 report from the Special Rapporteur of the 
United Nation’s Commission on Human Rights, augmented by annual reports of Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch.31  
 Simple bivariate patterns reveal that each one of these predictors are significantly 
associated with the legal status of capital punishment. Miethe, Lu and Deibert find that the 
likelihood of retaining capital punishment is significantly higher for countries that (1) have lower 
economic development, (2) experience lower political voice and accountability; (3) have lower 
political stability; (4) are dominated by religions other than Christianity; (5) are located in the 
Middle East, Asia, or the Caribbean regions; and (6) have recent histories of extrajudicial 
killings.32 
 Multivariate logistic regression analysis reveals that the first three factors remain 
significant when all the variables are taken into consideration. The authors report that “[t]he 
association between increasing economic development and legal abolition remains statistically 
significant even after successive controls for the nation’s primary religion, history of 
extrajudicial executions, and various measures of political conditions. … [U]nit increases in 
economic development decreased by about 50% the odds of legal retention of the death penalty 
after controlling for other variables.”33 There are of course exceptions, and the United States and 
Japan stand out as such among large industrialized nations. But the correlation is strong and 
capital punishment remains much more highly associated with low economic development. As 
the authors note, “more than two thirds of the developing countries (i.e., defined by GDP per 
capita of less than US$4,000 in 2000) have retained the death penalty in law.”34  
                                                            
31 Miethe, Lu & Deibert 2005:121-122. 
32 Miethe, Lu & Deibert 2005:122. 
33 Miethe, Lu & Deibert at 123.  
34 Miethe, Lu & Deibert at 127. 
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The other two measures of political conditions—political voice and stability—also had 
“significant net effects on the legal status of capital punishment. Countries with greater political 
voice had substantially lower net risks of legal retention, whereas the conditional odds of 
retaining the death penalty were about 2.3 times higher among more than less politically stable 
countries.”35 Along most of these dimensions then, with the single exception of political stability, 
the United States is an outlier: the resulting model would suggest that the United States should 
rank among abolitionist states.  
 The authors also used qualitative comparative analyses which look at the joint or 
conjunctive effects of the different variables to determine which combinations of variables are 
more or less likely to result in retention of the death penalty. Here too, the United States is an 
outlier, located in a cluster with a sociopolitical profile of predominantly abolitionist nations that 
includes, for instance, Australia, Canada, France, Italy, and Norway. This cluster—
predominantly Christian nations with high political voice, high political stability, and high 
economic development—contains 22 nations, of which 91% are abolitionist.36 The United States 
is singled out, in the analysis, as one of the few “Examples of exceptions to the dominant 
pattern.”37  
In sum, the two existing quantitative models intended to predict whether a jurisdiction 
should have the death penalty would suggest that the United States should have already 
abolished the ultimate penalty. In terms of highly industrialized large nations, the United States 
and Japan are the only countries that continue to use the death penalty. In terms of culturally and 
socio-politically similar countries, such as the United Kingdom or Canada, the United States is 
the only country with a death penalty. Even when we narrow the comparison group to these 
                                                            
35 Miethe, Lu & Deibert at 123-124. 
36 Miethe, Lu & Deibert 2005:125. 
37 Miethe, Lu & Deibert 2005: 125 n.a.. 
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“matching countries” – countries that have very similar cultural values and histories, such as 
Great Britain and Canada or even, to expand a little more, Germany, Mexico, Australia —the 
United States remains an outlier that should tend toward abolition.  
 There are, naturally, a host of cross-national cultural variables that are not as easily 
quantifiable and that have been offered to explain differences in death penalty regimes. Some are 
more convincing than others. At least in the U.S.-E.U. comparison, that one of the more 
important cultural factors should be the fact that the death penalty was used in a far more 
politicized manner in 18th and 19th century Europe and, as a result, the penalty itself had a very 
different symbolic meaning. It was not so closely tied to crime and punishment, but instead to the 
repression of political dissent. The repression of the Paris Commune in 1871, for instance, led to 
the execution of as many as 20,000 civilians—the number is contested, but Benedict Anderson 
places the number at 20,000 and others have estimated it as high as 50,000. In the United States, 
the primary political connection to the death penalty is racism—the use of capital punishment as 
a way to repress the African-American community. (Note that during the antebellum period, 
capital punishment of slaves was expensive to masters and therefore not used extensively. The 
death penalty and lynchings became more efficient tools of repression after emancipation). But I 
do not think that racism has the same resonance in the United States as political killings—
whether of Communards, anti-Jacobins, or Resistance members—has on the Continent. Another 
important cultural difference, again in the U.S.-E.U. context, is that the Left in Europe is much 
further to the left than in the United States. However, as Carol Steiker demonstrates ably in her 
article, Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism, even the most convincing non-
quantifiable cultural explanations leave a lot to be desired—which leaves us with the handful of 
quantitative predictors, which predominantly point in the direction of abolition for the U.S.  
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II. 
 Recent developments and these statistical analyses suggest strongly, then, that a number 
of retentionist states at the cusp will likely join abolitionist ranks, further pushing the United 
States to join its international abolitionist peer group. The question this raises, naturally, 
concerns the mechanics of abolition. What political and social factors will lead retentionist states 
at the cusp to tilt toward repeal of their capital statutes? 
 In addressing this question, the quantitative research is somewhat less helpful. There are 
a number of studies that have tried to identify the domestic factors that predict whether an 
individual state is abolitionist or retentionist. The leading predictors in this set of studies tend to 
include measures of ethnic or racial diversity, of inequality, of political ideology, and of religious 
faith. The difficulty with the quantitative research, though, is that in reality it tends to ultimately 
map the different regional characteristics of the predominant death states, notably the “Death 
Belt” states. Moreover, although the studies identify likely predictors of variation between 
retentionist and abolitionist states, they do not necessarily indicate which mechanisms influence 
abolition.   
 David Jacobs and Jason Carmichael have tested the leading hypotheses that have been 
offered to explain retention versus abolition in a series of studies. In their first, published in 
2002, The Political Sociology of the Death Penalty, Jacobs and Carmichael test three different 
hypotheses using state-level panel data. The first hypothesis is that enhanced minority presence 
may intimidate or threaten the majority population, and the majority may respond by deploying 
more repressive penal measures. To test this theory, Jacobs and Carmichael rely on measures of 
ethnic or racial diversity as a proxy for this theory of racial threat and tension. These measures 
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generally correspond, simply, to the proportion of the population consisting of African-American 
or Hispanic persons. The underlying rationale of the second hypothesis is similar, namely that 
political elites will use more repressive punitive methods when economic inequality and 
therefore potential conflict are greater. The authors rely on measures of economic inequality 
here, also as a proxy for social and economic threat.  The third hypothesis concerns the political 
strength of law-and-order conservative ideology in the population. Jacobs and Carmichael 
include other factors as well, such as the strength of the Republican party.  
In their 2002 study, Jacobs and Carmichael find that their state-level data support both 
the racial and economic threat explanations: “states with the largest black populations are more 
likely to retain capital punishment after the amount of violent crime and many other explanations 
are held constant, but we find no evidence that Hispanic presence matters.”38 They also find 
“strong support for the less prominent economic version of threat theory.”39 Jacobs and 
Carmichael also find a positive correlation between Republican party strength and the existence 
of capital punishment in cross-state comparisons. These findings are consistent with research in 
the broader area of punishment and incarceration. David Jacobs and Ronald Helms, in their 1997 
study on the determinants of prison admission rates, for instance, find that the increased political 
strength of the Republican party in a jurisdiction produces a subsequent growth in 
incarceration.40 In their 2004 study, Jacobs and Carmichael 2004 find that greater numbers of 
death sentences correlate with states with greater membership in conservative churches, and 
states with higher violent crime rates.41 
                                                            
38  Jacobs and Carmichael 2002:126. 
39  Jacobs and Carmichael 2002: 126. 
40 Jacobs and Helms 1997.  
41 Jacobs and Carmichael 2004. 
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The difficulty, again, is that these models are static in the sense that they identify the 
factors that explain the difference between retentionist and abolitionist states, but are not 
dynamic. They do not identify what changes occurred to move retentionist states into the 
abolitionist camp. To address this question, it is necessary instead to explore more anecdotal 
evidence regarding the historical shifts that have taken place in the broader movement toward 
abolition.    
A review of the larger historical literature suggests that, within those states at the cusp, 
two political forces will likely play important roles. The first is elite political leadership—or 
what one might think of as political leadership from the top. The second consists in ordinary acts 
of resistance—or what one might think of as bottom-up political opposition. I will address these 
in order, but begin by backing up one step.   
Abolition of the death penalty is not a political issue that creates political capital, that 
builds political support, or that makes a political career. A young or emerging politician at the 
local or national level, especially in a retentionist state, will never attract a majority of political 
support by advocating abolition of the death penalty. That is simply not the kind of political issue 
that works on the campaign trail.  
There are, in effect, two kinds of political issues in a democracy. There are political 
issues where the public is evenly divided. On these issues, it is possible to acquire political 
capital independently of the position advocated, based on oratory skill, charisma, or political 
ability. On these issues, even if the population is deeply emotionally invested, even if the issues 
raise deep cultural cleavages, it is possible to build political capital by changing a few votes. But 
there are other political issues—like the death penalty—where public sentiment is extremely 
lopsided. On those issues, a young politician cannot build political capital by taking the minority 
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position. On the contrary, it entails expending political capital. And the term “political capital” 
should be understood here literally: a politician will use up a portion of his or her popularity by 
advocating abolition, regardless of the fact that there may be, ultimately, a return on the 
investment. It may pay a political dividend in the future, but often it is a form of political 
recognition or admiration that has the quality of martyrdom rather than populism. The 
abolitionist political leader is viewed as someone who had moral conviction despite popular 
opposition; someone who went against the current of public opinion and who, in prevailing, 
acquired some moral status, recognition, or respect. These are the political leaders who are 
thought of as “just” or “righteous,” though not necessarily as popular.  
In this sense, abolitionist politics can produce a political aura, but rarely political votes. 
This was true, for instance, with regard to François Mitterand in France. Before the abolitionist 
reform, there was only a political debt to be paid—no votes to be had. Mitterand and Robert 
Badinter, his justice minister, understood this well and tried to minimize the damage. During the 
1974 electoral campaign between Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and Mitterand, both candidates were 
hostile to the death penalty—Mitterand far more than d’Estaing—yet neither of them mentioned 
the issue.42 As Robert Badinter writes, speaking of Mitterand on the death penalty, “he would 
only make a rare reference to the issue. Announcing an unpopular measure is not the best way to 
win votes. And it was a victory in the ballot box that he had to achieve first. Abolition would 
follow by itself.”43  
 This is not to suggest that abolitionist politicians should or do lie about their convictions. 
Again, taking the case of France, François Mitterand never lied about his position. Rather, he and 
                                                            
42 Robert Badinter, L’Abolition, at page 24, Paris: Fayard, 2000. 
43 Badinter, 2000, at 117. 
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others—d’Estaing and even Chirac in 198144—did not raise the issue on their own and did not 
campaign as abolitionists. On two occasions, Mitterand was asked about his position on the death 
penalty and on both occasions he responded honestly. But he never sought out the question as a 
campaign strategy. And his responses were always from the heart. During the 1981 elections, for 
instance, Mitterand was asked about his position on the death penalty, and he responded without 
hesitation: “In my conscience, in the deepest recesses of my faith, I am opposed to the death 
penalty… I don’t need to read the opinion polls to know that a majority of the people favor the 
death penalty. I’m a candidate for President of the Republic…. I say what I think, what I 
sincerely believe, my deepest spiritual attachments, my faith, my concern for our civilization. I 
am not in favor of the death penalty.”45 
 In this sense, abolition is not a political strategy. It is a political cost. The 2008 
Democratic primaries in the United States were illustrative. None of the three early democratic 
front-runners were willing to stake out a clear position against the death penalty. Whenever they 
expressed support for the ultimate punishment, it was always qualified. But frankly, it was 
difficult to know where they really stood—in their conscience. Hillary Clinton appears not to 
have made any direct statements on the death penalty, but according to some reports, she had 
difficulty with the issue.46 In the 2004 debates, Edwards cautiously supported the death penalty, 
noting that reforms were necessary: “I believe the death penalty is the most fitting punishment 
for the most heinous crimes, and I support it. But we need reforms in the death penalty to ensure 
that defendants receive fair trials, with zealous and competent lawyers, and with full access to 
                                                            
44 Badinter 2000 at 228. Chirac, as presidential candidate in 1981, was personally opposed to the death penalty, 
but did not make a big deal of his opposition. As a political matter, he proposed a referendum on the death penalty 
and stated that he would vote against. But again, he did not emphasize the death penalty issue.  
45 Badinter 2000 at 230.    
46 God and Hillary Clinton, by Paul Kengor, p. 81-82. 
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DNA testing.”47 Barack Obama, in his book, The Audacity of Hope, declared that “While the 
evidence tells me that the death penalty does little to deter crime, I believe there are some 
crimes—mass murder, the rape and murder of a child—so heinous that the community is 
justified in expressing the full measure of its outrage by meting out the ultimate punishment. On 
the other hand, the way capital cases were tried in Illinois at the time was so rife with error, 
questionable police tactics, racial bias, and shoddy lawyering, that 13 death row inmates had 
been exonerated.”48 Only marginal candidates—candidates with no hope of winning the 
primaries, such as Democrat Dennis Kucinich or Ron Paul on the GOP side—expressed 
opposition to the death penalty. 
 At the national level and within most retentionist states, capital punishment is a litmus 
test issue, somewhat like abortion and gay marriage. Advocating abolition is perceived by the 
vast majority of citizens as being weak on crime, almost unpatriotic. As a result, it is only 
possible for an elected politician to effectively oppose the death penalty once he or she is already 
in a political position with excess political capital. Illinois Governor George Ryan’s 
commutations are a good example of this. Ryan effectively expended political capital when he 
placed a moratorium on the death penalty. Ryan was a charismatic, populist Republican 
politician. He was a talented orator and had a gift with political audiences—and he had a lot of 
political capital. What is clear from the historical record is that he used up a lot of political 
capital when he intervened in the capital punishment arena. He did so in a charismatic and 
populist way. In fact, Ryan had a very compelling, “man on the street” approach to discussing 
his reforms. In discussing the moratorium, he would explain that being governor in a state with 
the death penalty is just like being the CEO of an airline: if 12 flights make it to their destination, 
                                                            
47 Associated Press policy Q&A, "Death Penalty" Jan 25, 2004. 
48 The Audacity of Hope, by Barack Obama, p. 58 . 
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but 13 crash and burn, you simply have to stop outgoing flights to find out what is happening.49 
It was that simple. And, of course, in Illinois, since the state had reinstated executions in 1977, 
12 inmates had been executed, while 13 had been exonerated. It was just good management to 
stop and inspect the planes. Ryan was extremely compelling and a formidable politician, but 
there was no question he was using up his political capital. In his case, the later commutations 
were shrouded in allegations of political corruption and he was accused of taking the moral high-
ground on the death penalty in order to whitewash his political shenanigans and dry clean his 
reputation. But notice that the moratorium and commutations will remain one of his principal 
political legacies—something he did out of conviction, despite the fact that it was not popular. It 
may bring him respect in some quarters, but it did not build political capital. It was only possible 
because he had political capital to spare.  
 Elite political leadership of this type has always been important in the shift toward 
abolition. As Roger Hood explains, “political leadership has been a potent factor.” This was true 
in France, but also in “the former German Democratic Republic, which in 1987 declared that 
capital punishment was no longer essential to defend socialism from violent crimes or even the 
legacy of Nazi war crimes. Georgia abolished capital punishment on the initiative of its President 
Edouard Shevardnatze in 1997, two years before becoming a member of the Council of Europe 
in 1999…. In South Africa, where the abolitionist movement had been unable to make any 
headway, it was the influence of Nelson Mandela and his new government which encouraged the 
Constitutional Court, in the landmark judgment in The State v. Makwanyane and Mchunu handed 
down in June 1995, to declare that capital punishment was incompatible with the prohibition 
                                                            
49 I recall participating at an event with Governor Ryan in Chicago after he had placed a moratorium on 
executions and this was how he presented the matter.  
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against ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading’ punishment  and with a ‘human rights culture,” despite the 
heightened concerns about rising crime in that country.”50 
 Abolition is simply not a democratic issue. As Neumayer remarks, “leadership by the 
political elite is important since in many countries abolition has been achieved against the 
majority opinion of the people.”51 Naturally, this raises an interesting question about the link 
Neumayer discovered between democracy and abolition. The answer, though, seems to revolve 
around the fact that democracies often leave room for elite politics. As Neumayer suggests, “any 
positive link between democracy and abolition is not caused by the fact that democracies are 
more accountable to the will of the people. Rather, what matters is that in most (full) 
democracies the political elite is willing to grant inviolable rights to all individuals, even if they 
are criminals, and to ignore public opinion, which might at times remain in favor of the death 
penalty.”52   
 
III. 
 Another important factor on the road to abolition—one that receives far less attention 
because it is so much less visible—is the minor acts of resistance that tend to delay, prolong, and 
generally disrupt death penalty cases. These are the actions of men and women in retentionist 
states who, sometimes consciously but even more often unconsciously, delay death penalty 
cases. Though not necessarily abolitionists themselves, they may find capital punishment 
unpleasant, uncomfortable, slightly disturbing, perhaps even a bit disgusting, something they 
would prefer simply not to deal with. The parallels in the debates over methods of execution and 
forms of torture, or for that matter the similarities in the discourses of suffocation in the lethal 
                                                            
50 Hood 2001:338. 
51 Neumayer 2006:10. 
52 Neumayer 2006:10 
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injection and the “water-boarding” controversies—discussed so ably in Robin Wagner-Pacifici’s 
chapter in this book—are hard to escape or ignore. They infiltrate and permeate our thoughts 
about the death penalty, even if unconsciously. They make many people uncomfortable with the 
death penalty, even if unknowingly. And the resulting denial, discomfort, suppression, or simple 
plain disregard for death penalty cases has a significant impact on the life course of these capital 
cases. These men and women, whether by unconsciously trying to suppress these thoughts or 
deliberately ignoring the cases, effectively gummy up the capital punishment system—they slow 
it down, they put it on hold, they create delay, often unknowingly or unconsciously.  
Clerks in the back office, secretaries and administrative assistants, a police officer, an 
investigator, a prison guard, people who have had their own brushes with the law or whose 
family members have been incarcerated—and given the high rate of incarceration in the United 
States today, reaching one percent of the adult population, there are many such people—these 
people render the death penalty system inefficient and somewhat ineffectual. In several death 
penalty cases that I have been involved as a litigator, I have encountered more than just inertia—
more than just laziness or distraction. I have experienced almost intentional or deliberate delay 
by men and women in all categories of life who take it upon themselves to stall a death penalty 
prosecution by ignoring it. It is these acts of resistance—one could say unconscious minor acts of 
sabotage—that render the death penalty simply ineffectual in many states. The deliberate 
resistance of doctors to participate in the mechanics of capital punishment is the conscious and 
public manifestation of these forms of resistance, but the phenomenon tends to be far more 
unconscious and, as a result, pervasive.  
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 The model to understand these acts is that of “everyday acts of resistance” developed by 
James C. Scott53 and notions of “moral economy” developed in the work of E.P. Thompson.54 
Everyday acts of resistance offers a model to understand the way that politically less-powerful 
groups achieve resistance to a dominant political framework. Through hidden transcripts and 
minor deviant acts, the less-powerful groups challenge the dominant regime, and gummy up the 
system. Those same acts of resistance can also be understood through the lens of moral 
economy. In his essay, The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century, 
Thompson discusses how actions that may otherwise be interpreted through more familiar lenses 
of delay, deviance or even criminality, may actually bear important political dimensions. 
Thompson argued, for instance, that acts traditionally described as simple vandalism are often 
forms of political expression, of political protest or resistance to a political economic system 
which may appear to the actor as oppressive, disgusting, alien, or morally wrong. In his essay, 
Thompson describes how the food “riot” in eighteenth-century England may not have been mere 
spasmodic and occasional social disturbances brought about by a bad harvest, but actually 
politically engaged resistance to, at the time, a relatively new laissez faire political economy. 
These acts, Thompson argues, were “a highly complex form of direct popular action. . . 
operat[ing] within a popular consensus as to what were legitimate and what were illegitimate 
practices in marketing, milling, baking, etc.”55 The food riots were not about hunger, but about 
the perceived violation of a moral economy.  The act of rioting was not about stealing food, but 
about damaging the mills and machinery — acts which were counterproductive from a hunger 
                                                            
53 James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Subsistence and Rebellion in Southeast Asia (1976); 
James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (1985); James C. Scott, Domination 
and the Arts of Resistance: The Hidden Transcript of Subordinate Groups (1990). 
54 E.P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,” in Customs in 
Common, 185-258. New York: Penguin Books, 1991. 
55 Thompson 1991:188. 
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perspective. The riots were a response to the perceived violation to the legitimate beliefs and 
moral order of the economy.  
 A traditional critique of resistance theories is that the ordinary acts of resistance tend to 
serve as substitutes for more direct and significant reform, thereby impeding political change. 
This critique may be more powerful in other contexts, but in the death penalty arena it seems to 
operate differently. The minor acts of resistance here seem to be effectual precisely because they 
tend to sap the capital punishment system of its moral legitimacy. The lengthy delays undermine 
the primary justifications for the death penalty—whether it is the deterrent effect of the sentence 
of death, the finality of the punishment, or the moral equivalence, the jus talionis of the death 
sentence. This may reflect the unique ways in which sovereignty is constituted in the death 
penalty context—a question raised poignantly in Peter Fitzpatrick’s contribution to this book.56 
But in this particular context, those minor acts of resistance seem to erode the political support 
necessary for capital punishment to continue to function.  
 Another sentiment, also frequent in the United States, tends to contribute to the everyday 
acts of resistance: rooting for the underdog. This too is a strong strain in American culture. Many 
ordinary citizens are willing to help someone condemned to death when they feel that the system 
is stacked against them. There need not always be moral opposition to the death penalty, but 
simply a feeling that the scales are too heavily weighted in favor of the state. Naturally, these are 
not the dominant passions that are always encountered in death penalty cases. These are not the 
more public transcripts, but the hidden ones. The majority of actors in death penalty cases are 
deliberately seeking to promote the execution of the sentence of death. But the small acts of 
resistance—and the sustaining acts of kindness—have an important effect on the capital 
punishment system.     
                                                            
56  Fitzpatrick 2008. 
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IV. 
The empirical data reflect a clear trend toward abolition:  in all probability, the United 
States, like the larger international community, will experience greater abolition of the death 
penalty during the first half of the twenty-first century. There is no reason to believe that the 
movement toward abolition will be especially rapid. As Michael McCann and David Johnson 
ably discuss in their chapter, there are important institutional impediments to abolition in the 
United States. There are numerous features unique to our federal system of criminal justice—
such as localized elections, decentralized policing and corrections, and multiple and dispersed 
layers of appellate court review—that present obstacles to abolition in the individual states.57 
Nevertheless, the evidence pointing toward greater abolition has been steady and consistent not 
only in the last quarter of the twentieth century, but also in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century. It may well take twenty years for the momentum to reach a tipping point, but the 
direction of change favors abolition rather than retention.  
It is unlikely that the momentum will start in the deepest corridors of the Death Belt—in 
Texas or Alabama. It is far more likely that states such as Kansas or New Hampshire that have 
not executed anyone since the resumption of the death penalty in 1976 or states such as 
Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, New Mexico, South Dakota or Wyoming that have only executed 
one inmate since 1976, will gravitate toward abolition first. But in the process, it is probable that 
the movement toward greater abolition will eventually bring about a federal constitutional ban on 
capital punishment in the United States. And it is likely that this will occur before 2050.  
With the eventual abolition of capital punishment in the United States, it is entirely 
reasonable to expect that, by the mid-twenty-first century, capital punishment will have the same 
                                                            
57  McCann and Johnson 2008: ____. 
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status as torture within the larger international community: an outlier practice, prohibited by 
international agreements and customary international law, practiced illicitly by rogue nations, 
and defended only by a handful of conservative academics seeking attention. 
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